Post by TheInquirerPost by Immortalistwhy no? if the null hypothesis is used to support the null hypothesis,
isn't that circular argument? and wouldn't this procedure increase
dogmatic bias?
possible worlds
can there be more than two possible worlds?
Flipping a coin has only two neat possible worlds for you, head or
tails. Other situations have more possible outcomes and that many
possible world explanations.
It might help to see the difference between deductive certainty vs
inductive probability.
Two views of Deduction & Induction:
View 1: conclusion;
Deduction = infers particular from general truths
Induction = infers general from particular truths
View 2: conclusion;
Deduction = follows with absolute necessity
Induction = follows with some degree of probability
In defense of view 2:
Deduction and Induction From
Introduction to Logic Irving M. Copi
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/
1.6 Deduction and Induction
Arguments are traditionally divided into two different types,
deductive and inductive. Every argument involves the claim (noted
earlier) that its premisses provide some grounds for the truth of its
conclusion, but only a deductive argument involves the claim that its
premisses provide conclusive grounds for its conclusion. When the
reasoning in a deductive argument is correct, we call that argument
valid; when the reasoning of a deductive argument is incorrect, we
call that argument invalid.
We may therefore define validity as follows. A deductive argument is
valid when its premisses, if true, do provide conclusive grounds for
the truth of its conclusion. In a valid deductive argument (but not in
an inductive argument), premisses and conclusion are so related that
it is absolutely impossible for the premisses to be true unless the
conclusion is true also.
In every deductive argument, either the premisses succeed in providing
conclusive grounds for the truth of the conclusion, or they do not
succeed. Therefore, every deductive argument is either valid or
invalid. This is a point of some importance: If a deductive argument
is not valid, it must be invalid; if it is not invalid, it must be
valid. But note that the terms "valid" and "invalid" do not apply to
inductive arguments; for inductive arguments, other terms of appraisal
are required.
In the realm of deductive logic, the central task is to clarify the
relation between premisses and conclusion in valid arguments, and thus
to allow us to discriminate valid from invalid arguments...
An inductive argument makes a very different claim: not that its
premisses give conclusive grounds for the truth of its conclusion, but
only that its premisses provide some support for that conclusion.
Inductive arguments, therefore, cannot be "valid" or "invalid" in the
sense in which these terms are applied to deductive arguments. Of
course, inductive arguments may be evaluated as better or worse,
according to the degree of support given to their conclusions by their
premisses. Thus, the greater the likelihood, or probability, that its
premisses confer on its conclusion, the greater the merit of an
inductive argument. But that likelihood, even when the premisses are
all true, must fall short of certainty. The theory of induction and
the methods of calculating probabilities are presented in Part 3 of
this book.
The distinction between deductive and inductive arguments is sometimes
drawn in a different way-centering on the relative generality of their
premisses and conclusions. Deductive inferences, it is sometimes said,
move from the general to the particular, while inductive inferences
move from the particular to the general. On analysis, this way of
distinguishing them proves unsatisfactory. ["William Whewell, in The
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840), put it thus: ". . . in
Deduction we infer particular from general truths; while in Induction
we infer general from particular."]
In that tradition, the classical example of a deductive argument:
All humans are mortal.
Socrates is human.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.
does indeed have a particular conclusion, inferred validly from two
premisses of which the first is a general or universal proposition.
[The term "particular" was used by Whewell, and other logicians in his
tradition, to refer to propositions about a single thing (e.g.,
Socrates) as well as to propositions about some but not necessarily
all members of a given class (e.g., some humans). More recent logical
practice uses the phrase "particular propositions" to refer only to
the latter group. At this point, we are examining Whewell's view and
therefore follow his usage.] It is also true that a very common form
of inductive argument is one in which a general or universal
conclusion is inferred from a group of premisses, all of which are
particular, as in this example:
Socrates is human and mortal.
Xanthippe is human and mortal
Sappho is human and mortal.
Therefore probably all humans are mortal.
But this method of distinguishing between deduction and induction does
not always work. The difficulty lies in the fact that a valid
deductive argument may have universal propositions for its conclusion
as well as for its premisses, as in:
All animals are mortal.
All humans are animals.
Therefore all humans are mortal.
And a valid deductive argument may have particular propositions for
its premisses as well as for its conclusion, as in:
If Socrates is human then Socrates is mortal.
Socrates is human.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.
Moreover, an inductive argument need not rely only on particular
premisses but may have universal (i.e., general) propositions for its
premisses as well for its conclusions, as in:
All cows are mammals and have lungs.
All whales are mammals and have lungs.
All humans are mammals and have lungs.
Therefore probably all mammals have lungs.
And further, an inductive argument may have a particular proposition
as its conclusion, as in:
Hitler was a dictator and was ruthless.
Stalin was a dictator and was ruthless.
Castro is a dictator.
Therefore Castro is probably ruthless.
These counterexamples show that it is not satisfactory to characterize
deductive arguments as those in which particular conclusions are
inferred from general premisses; nor is it satisfactory to
characterize inductive arguments as those in which general conclusions
are inferred from particular premisses.
The fundamental difference between these two kinds of argument lies in
the claims that are made about the relations between premisses and
conclusion. Deductive arguments are those in which a very strict or
close relationship is claimed to hold between the premisses and the
conclusions. If a deductive argument is valid, then, given the truth
of its premisses, its conclusion must be true no matter what else may
be the case.
For example, if it is true that all humans are mortal, and if it is
true that Socrates is a human, then it must be true that Socrates is
mortal no matter what else may be true in the world and no matter what
other premisses are added or other information discovered. If we find
that Socrates is ugly, or that angels are immortal, or that cows give
milk, this finding affects the validity of the argument not one bit;
the conclusion that Socrates is mortal follows from any enlarged set
of premisses with deductive certainty, just as it did from the two
premisses originally given. If an argument is valid, nothing
additional in the world can make it more valid; if a conclusion is
validly inferred from some set of premisses, nothing can be added to
that set to make that conclusion follow more validly or more strictly
or more logically.
But the relation between premisses and conclusion claimed for even the
best inductive argument is much less strict and very different in
kind. Consider the following inductive argument:
Most corporation lawyers are conservatives.
Barbara Shane is a corporation lawyer.
Therefore Barbara Shane is probably a conservative.
This is a pretty good inductive argument; its first premiss is true,
and if its second premiss is also true, its conclusion is more likely
true than false. But in this case, if new premisses are added to the
original pair the resulting argument may be substantially weakened or
(depending on the premisses added) strengthened. Suppose we add the
premiss that
Barbara Shane is an officer of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU).
and also add the (true) premiss that:
Most officers of the ACLU are not conservatives.
Now the conclusion [that Barbara Shane is a conservative] no longer
seems very probable; the original inductive argument has been greatly
weakened by the presence of this additional information about Barbara
Shane. Indeed, if the final premiss were transformed into the
universal proposition:
No officers of the ACLU are conservatives.
the opposite of the original conclusion would now follow deductively,
that is, validly, from the set of premisses affirmed.
On the other hand, if we enlarge the original set of premisses by
adding the following additional premisses instead:
Barbara Shane served in the cabinet of President Ronald Reagan.
and
Barbara Shane has long been an officer of the National Rifle
Association.
then the original conclusion follows with a greater likelihood from
this enlarged set of premisses than it did from the original set.
The strength of the claim about the relation between the premisses and
the conclusion of the argument is the nub of the difference between
deductive and inductive arguments. We characterize the two types of
arguments as follows: A deductive argument is one whose conclusion is
claimed to follow from its premisses with absolute necessity, this
necessity not being a matter of degree and not depending in any way on
whatever else may be the case; in sharp contrast, an inductive
argument is one whose conclusion is claimed to follow from its
premisses only with probability, this probability being a matter of
degree and dependent upon what else may be the case.
Although probability is the essence of the relation between premisses
and conclusion in inductive arguments, such arguments do not always
acknowledge explicitly that their conclusions are inferred only with
some degree of probability. On the other hand, the mere presence of
the word "probability" within an argument is no sure indication that
the argument is inductive, because there are some strictly deductive
arguments about probabilities themselves. Arguments of this kind, in
which the probability of a certain combination of events is deduced
from the probabilities of other events, are discussed in Chapter 14.
SUMMARY OF SECTION 1.6
In this section, we discuss the essential nature of deductive and of
inductive arguments. The core of the difference between deductive and
inductive arguments lies in the strength of the claim that is made
about the relation between the premisses of the argument and its
conclusion.
In deductive arguments, the conclusion is claimed to follow from its
premisses with absolute necessity; in inductive arguments, the
conclusion is claimed to follow from its premisses only with some
degree of probability.
A deductive argument is valid if its premisses do provide conclusive
proof of its conclusion; otherwise it is invalid. But the terms
"validity" and "invalidity" do not apply to inductive arguments, which
are appraised with other terms.
The addition of new premisses may alter the strength of an inductive
argument, but a deductive argument, if valid, cannot be made more
valid or invalid by the addition of any premisses.
Introduction to Logic
by Irving M. Copi, Carl Cohen
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0130749214/qid=1095180612/
Post by TheInquireris there a way to tell if our world is the same as one of the possible
worlds?
We are trapped with using Mills Methods of inductive probability to
determine that.
The method of agreement involves ascertaining a "common factor. The
common factor should be one that is present whenever the effect is
present.
The method of difference involves evaluating two cases, one in which
the effect is present, and one where it is absent. If when the effect
is absent, the possible cause "X" is also absent, the test lends
support to "X" as the cause.
The joint method involves combining the first two methods.
The method of concomitant variation involves showing that as one
factor varies, another varies in a corresponding way.
The method of residues involves "subtracting out" those aspects of the
effect whose causes are known and concluding that the rest of the
effect ("the residue") is due to an additional cause.
http://www.ehow.com/how_4857860_identify-mills-methods-of-induction.html
"If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all
the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given
phenomenon."
"If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs,
and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in
common save one, that one occurring only in the former; the
circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect,
or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the
phenomenon."
"If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one
circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does
not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that
circumstance: the circumstance in which alone the two sets of
instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the
cause, of the phenomenon."
"Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon
varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of
that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of
causation."
"Deduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous
inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of
the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents."
http://www.ehow.com/how_4857860_identify-mills-methods-of-induction.html
Post by TheInquirerif A and not A are both possible, why should i prefer one over the other?
In Vegas we can bet on the black or the red even though only one is
the winner. Some other possible outcomes have different probabilities
than a 50/50 chance.
- A priori/a posteriori, analytic/synthetic, necessary/contingent
In this chapter we have learned of three ways to characterize
statements that are of particular interest to the philosopher: each
statement is (i) either necessary or contingent, (ii) either analytic
or synthetic, (iii) either a priori or empirical (or a posteriori). We
shall now take a brief look at how these three distinctions are
interrelated.
First, notice that these three distinctions pertain to three distinct
aspects of a statement.
1. The necessary/contingent distinction concerns the modal status of a
statement. To say that a statement is necessarily true is to say that
it must be true or that it is true in all possible worlds. A statement
is contingently true in case it just happens to be true because of the
way the actual world is.
2. The analytic/synthetic distinction concerns the basis of a
statement's truth or falsity. To say that a statement is analytically
true is to say that its truth is grounded solely in the meaning of its
terms and the laws of logic. A statement is synthetically true just in
case its truth is not grounded exclusively on the meaning of its terms
and on the laws of logic.
3. The a priori/a posteriori distinction concerns the epistemic status
of a statement. To say that a statement is true a priori is to say
that its truth can be known without appeal to experience. A statement
is true a posteriori just in case its truth can only be known by
relying on experience.
Having noted the differences between these three distinctions,
consider their similarities. The most striking observation about these
three distinctions is that they seem to divide up the set of
statements into exactly the same subclasses. That is, we can use each
one of the three distinctions to divide the set of statements into two
classes: the one consists of necessary, analytic, and a priori
statements; the other contains contingent, synthetic, and a posteriori
statements. But this neat division of statements into two groups is
not universally accepted. The most notable dissenters have been
Immanuel Kant and, in our times, Saul Kripke. Kant argued that some
statements are necessary, synthetic and a priori; for example, "Every
event has a cause." Ever since, "the problem of the synthetic a
priori" has occupied a fairly central position on the philosophical
stage. Recently, Kripke argued that some statements are necessary,
synthetic, and a posteriori. "Water is H2O," "Heat is mean molecular
energy," and other such theoretical identifications are examples of
such a posteriori necessities.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
Post by TheInquireris it also possible that there can be a higher view that explains
two or more seemingly contradictory views?
My specialty and favorite part of philosophy is Epistemology which
like Ethics or Religion are just three meta philosophy approaches of
the many that deal with multiple arguments sub arguments in their
domains.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/
http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics
http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_religion
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy
Post by TheInquirerPost by Immortalisti thought null hypotheses are set up to be rejected, in a
sort of probabilistic "prove by contradiction" manner?
No.
you are not referring to standard statistical procedures, are you?
it is really a test of how well the theory makes any other theory> less likely
Yes if using inductive logic, see above.
Post by TheInquireror even impossible. We must tighten our hypothesis in ways
Post by Immortalistthat make the null alternatives less likely or even impossible. Once
the remaining counter-theories sound
supernatural
what is supernatural? isn't it just knowledge / technology that is
currently not known?
It refers to how believable vs far out the theory and its evidence
sosund.
In science, a theory is an explanation. Evolution is a theory, just
like gravitation. Gravity is not a law of nature but an explanation of
observations. If you drop something, it's going to fall. That's an
observation: unsupported things fall. But you explain that observation
with the theory of gravity, which is that the mass of what whatever it
is you dropped, a pencil or a pen or something, is attracted by the
mass...it's really a theory of gravity? But remember, a theory is an
explanation.
For example this Matrix movie like theory sounds unlikely but has not
been shown to be impossible so it is inductive and could be true but
probably not.
Dr. Know & the Braino Helmet
Imagime that a superscientist invents machine--we shall call it a
"braino," - that enables him to produce hallucianations in certain
subjects . The machine operates by influencing the brain of a subject
who wears a special cap, called a "braino cap." when the braino cap is
placed on a subject's head, the operator of the braino can affect his
brain so as to produce any hallucination in the subject that the
operator wishes. The braino is a hallucination-producing machine. The
hallucinations produced by it may be as incomplete, systematic, and
coherent as the operator of the branio desires to make them.
The present argument starts from the premise that the braino is a
logical possibility, and consequently that there should be
hallucinations that are coherent, complete, and systematic in every
way. From the premise of logical possibility, we conclude that we in
fact have no way of telling whether or not we are hallucinating.
If the braino is a logical possibility, then how can we tell that
hallucinations are not in fact so hard to detect? On the contrary, we
may suffer hallucinations that we cannot detect. If it is logically
possible that hallucinations should be coherent, complete, and
systematic in every way, then there is no way of detecting at any
moment that we are not suffering from a hallucionation.
How we can tell that we are not hallucinating. The braino argument is
intended to establish that we can never tell this, even if we can
sometimes tell that we are hallucinating. Consider some perceptual
belief that you would maintain does not from hallucinations. what
experiences guarantee this? Indeed, what experiences provide you with
any evidence of it?
Notice that whatever experience you indicate, the braino argument will
be quite sufficient to prove that such an experience is no guarantee
against hallucianation. All we need do is imagine that you have,
unknown to yourself, the braino cap on your head. the operator of the
braino is producing the very experiences you claim guarantee that you
are not hallucinating.
Imagine that all people are controlled by the braino and that the
machine is run by some evil being, Dr. Know, who plots to keep us
completely in error through hallucinations. Dr. Know does not wish to
be detected, so he supplies hallucinations that are coherent,
complete, and systematic. Indeed, the hallucinations he produced in us
are a PERFECT COUNTERFEIT OF REALITY.
Our experiences fulfill our expectations and contain no more surprises
than we would expect from reality. But is it not reality we
experience; our perceptual beliefs about the world are quite mistaken,
for the source of our experiences is a mere machine, the braino, which
creates hallutionations. In such a predicament we might have just the
sort of perceptual beliefs we now have, based on experiences exactly
similar to those we now have. But our perceptual beliefs would be
altogether false.
The imagined situation is exactly similar to ours with respect to the
reasons or evidence we would have for our perceptual beliefs.
Experience is virtually the same in both cases. Consequently, if we
lack knowledge in one situation, we must surely lack it in the other.
Obviously, we lack knowledge when we are controlled by the braino, for
then our perceptual beliefs are false. Hence, we also lack knowledge
in our present situation. More precisely, our perceptual beliefs fail
to constitute knowledge in either case.
We believe that we are not controlled by such a machine, and if we are
fortunate in this belief, then no doubt many of our perceptual beliefs
are true. It is, however, good fortune and not good evidence that we
should thank for correctness of these beliefs.
We are just lucky if there is no Dr. Know controlling us with a
braino; and from that good fortune may result the further good fortune
that most of our perceptual beliefs are true. it is just a matter of
luck, however, and nothing epistemologically more glorious than that.
If a belief is true as a result of luck, then it is a lucky guess--not
knowledge.
Adapted from Keith Lehrer
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
http://books.google.com/books?id=cRHegYZgyfUC&printsec=frontcover
Post by TheInquirerour hypothesis
Post by Immortalistbecome null-proofed.
To determine whether a statement is logically necessary or logically
impossible, it is important to understand the meaning of the statement
as clearly as possible.
fully agreed.
so are there a universally agreed definitions of the terms "deity" and
"supernatural"?
I only used the term as an adjetive to the noun likeliness or
probability.
Post by TheInquirerPost by ImmortalistPost by ImmortalistPost by TheInquirerworse still, if the null hypothesis is accepted at x% level
of significance, do we know the actual probability that it
is mistaken?
If matters remain at the level of denial and simple assertion, we have
arrived at an impasse, and neither party to the dispute can claim
victory. It is essential that we move beyond this level of
argumentation.
precisely my point.
No.
it was meant to be a question to spur thinking and discussion. i'm
not sure standard statistical procedures are epistemologically sound.
are they?
Inductive Logic is part of Epistemology: see above.
Post by TheInquirer The impasse is created by people trying to force each other to
Post by Immortalistaccept some propositions without any evidence to support them.
it's worse if the definitions are fuzzy, isn't it?
A dogma, as we are using the term, is an assumption one makes
uncritically, with no attempt at reflective justification, and which
one feels is perfectly evident, something which, stands in no need of
serious examination. The unquestioned assumption that we gain
knowledge of the existence and characteristics of ordinary objects by
means of perception is a dogma...
...If a person says that he knows the answer to some question or
problem, and then tells us what he knows, his claim to know is
intended to end debate on the topic. If we are wondering whether all
liquids expand when they freeze, as water does, or whether that is a
special feature of water, and someone claims to know that this is a
special feature of water and that other liquids do not behave in a
similar manner, he is making a claim intended to terminate inquiry in
this matter. Often we welcome relief from uncertainty, but it is worth
asking whether such relief from doubt is philosophically warranted.
Once we note that a Knowledge claim is intended to terminate inquiry,
we may become wary of such claims, for fear of falling prey to
uncritical conviction; in other words, to dogmatism. Knowledge claims
are dogmatic, though we may not notice this, perhaps because we like
to think ourselves enlightened and undogmatic in our own knowledge
claims. But are we? Once we raise fundamental issues, dogma and
knowledge become inextricably intertwined. Our convictions concerning
the source of knowledge, how we know, are dogmatic. At one time it was
dogma that knowledge comes from revelation.. A peison accepting such
dogma might think she knows that someone is possessed by the devil, by
observing alterations in her personality and behavior that constitute
demonic possession. Starting from different assumptions, we might deny
that such people observed demonic possession. Notice how dogmatic our
competing claims are! We begin with a different dogma, crudely put,
that empirical science rather than revelation is the source of
knowledge. Having adopted that dogma, we reject those knowledge claims
based on competing assumptions, those of revelation, for example. So
which dogma is correct? The religious one? The scientific one? To ask
is to enter the debate with the skeptic, who answers with a question,
"Who knows?" Her smile reveals her conclusion? No one knows...
...We suppose that we know of the existence and characteristics of
objects by means of the senses, by perception. Perceptual belief is
the best source of knowledge, or so we dogmatically assume. But do our
perceptual beliefs constitute knowledge?
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
Entire book at Google
http://tinyurl.com/5qf5ym
http://books.google.com/books?printsec=frontcover&id=cRHegYZgyfUC&output=html
Post by TheInquirerPost by ImmortalistA direct challenge to the sceptic's contention that nothing can be
known with certainty.
not sure if that's my brand of scepticism or skepticism.
Post by ImmortalistCoherence theory: "An empirical belief is realatively true if and only
if it coheres with a system of other beliefs, which together form a
comprehensive account of reality."
i'm not a professional philosopher (obviously), but i have heard of this
one. i might be using a little of this.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence/
vs
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/
Post by TheInquirerPost by ImmortalistIn science, "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it
would be perverse to withhold provisional assent."
what is "perverse"? is the scientific community the final judge? what
if other communities (not necessarily uniformed or unintelligent, but
just happened to have chosen a different career path) disagree?
are there ways to proof against in-breeding? are there ways to proof
against lack of academic freedom (e.g. pressure from employers, funding
agencies)?
Post by ImmortalistDepends upon the evidential and conceptual ("context") of reasoning.
An inductive argument from evidence to hypothesis is inductively
cogent if and only if the hypothesis is that hypothesis which, of all
the competing hypothesis, has the greatest probability of being true
on the basis of the evidence.
this one ... looks promising. might be what i am intuitively trying
to do without knowing the technical term for it.
question: how do i assign probability?
[ note: if one reads textbooks on probability written by mathematicians
and statisticians but not those written by scientists and engineers, one
would find that probability and randomness is only defined
axiomatically. there can be different probability measures. ]
It can be open ended and go
Post by Immortaliston forever or it can become circular where each support depending on
the last leads to the same supports over time. This is how scepticism
defeated foundationalism. It seems that all we were left with a hope
for escape from this dilemma of no certain knowledge is a modified
version of the circular argument. Instead of a linear regress of
justifiactions we seek a nonlinear context of groups of evidences or
propositions emerging more evidence than other means of gaining
supports from evidences and propositions. Though we close the circle,
different circlular arguments, corespond to, predict, and manilulate,
events in the world, than other such arguments. If we have a
competition amoungst such partial certainties, we gain at least the
best knowledge we can find.
how about trying to find a synthesis among competing axiom sets?
that too
once again
Mill's Methods
Mill's methods are some methods used to formulate hypotheses of
certain phenomena. It is clearly a species of inductive arguments as
we shall see. More precisely the methods, first proposed by British
philosopher and logician John Stuart Mill, are used to find causes of
the phenomena to be explained. All of Mill's methods share the same
characteristics in that they separate the phenomena into two parts,
namely the parts to be explained, or the effects, and the antecedent
phenomena which include the likely causes of the effects. The method
is conducted by observing the effects and then reason to the likely
causes by observing common features, different features, features that
vary with each other, and so on. According to Mill, there are five of
his methods:
1. Method of Agreement
2. Method of Difference
3. Method of Agreement and Difference (Joint Method)
4. Method of Residue
5. Method of Concomittant Variation
----------------------------------------
1. Method of Agreement
----------------------------------------
Here is what the first method, Method of Agreement, does. First you
have a phenomenon you would like explained, for example a group of
students in a certain school all having diarrhea and vomiting. You
want to know what caused the symptom. You know that the symptom could
only be caused by food. So you list all the food eated by the affected
student up to the time when they were attacked, and suppose this is
the result:
A B C D ==> j h l k
E F A G ==> k o m n
H I J A ==> q r s k
The capital letters on the left hand side represent the antecedent
conditions, and the small letters on the right show the phenomena on
the effects side. Thus, in case of the students having diarrhea, the
left hand side represents the food eated by the students, and the
right hand side show the symptoms that they have. Suppose that each
capital letter represents a kind of food, and the small letters on the
right hand side represent a symptom. Then we can see that the
phenomena on the left hand side have one thing in common, A. And
similarly for the phenomena on the right hand side, the symptom k.
Thus we can conclude, using the First Method, that A is the likely
cause of k.
---------------------------------------
2. Method of Difference
---------------------------------------
Here is the diagram for the second method:
A B C D ==> j k l m
B C D ==> m l j
Suppose we have only two events which are alike in all aspects but
one. Then it is likely that the part that is the difference on the
left had side is the cause of the part that is missing on the right
hand side.
------------------------------------------------
3. Method of Agreement & Difference
- - (Joint Method)
------------------------------------------------
The third method has nothing but a joint consideration of the first
two methods in finding likely causes. Let's look at this diagram
A B C D ==> k l m o
A E F G ==> l p n r
A H I J ==> q u r l
H I M N ==> q r z y
O P Q R ==> x w n r
---------------------------------------------
4. Method of Residue
---------------------------------------------
Here is the diagram for the fourth method:
A B C D ==> o p q r
We know already that
A ==> p
B ==> q
C ==> r
Thus, we can conclude that D is the likely cause of o, because the
pair is the only one left from the matching of causes and effects
which we know already. That is why this method is called the Method of
Residue.
----------------------------------------------
5. Method of Concomittant Variation
----------------------------------------------
Here is the diagram for the last method:
A B C D1 ==> w x y z1
A B C D2 ==> w x y z2
A B C D3 ==> w x y z3
A B C D4 ==> w x y z4
A B C D5 ==> w x y z5
The phenomena are alike except only that there is a variation in the
degree of D on the left hand (causes) side, and the same for z on the
right hand side. Since everything else is equal we conclude that here
D is the likely cause of z.
http://pioneer.netserv.chula.ac.th/~hsoraj/PhilandLogic/WeekFive.html#Mill
http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/sci/mill.php
http://www.thelogician.net/4_logic_of_causation/4_mills_methods.htm
Post by TheInquirerPost by ImmortalistQuine's Web of Beliefs
but we cannot
Post by Immortalistrule out the possibility that some observations will require sweeping
changes in the web.
... that leads a few people to a mode of intense questioning?
Post by ImmortalistThus, these philosophers give certain beliefs a privileged place in
the web. They are protected by something like a one-way glass.
examples?
No. Think of your own. Some beliefs are more important than others and
are harder to change. You snipped out your answer anyway.
Basically, cognitive dissonance is a state of tension that occurs
whenever an individual simualtaniiously holds two cognitions (ideas,
attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent.
Stated differently, two cognitions are dissonant if, considering these
two cognitions alone, the opposite of one follows from the other.
Because the occurrance of cognitive dissonance is unpleasant, people
are motivated to reduce it; this is roughly analogous to the processes
involved in the induction and reduction of such drives as hunger or
thirst----except that, here, the driving force arises from cognitive
dissonance rather than physiological needs. To hold two ideas that
contradict each other is to flirt with absurdity, and---as Albert
Camus, the existentialist philosopher, has observed---humans are
creatures who sppend their lives trying to convine themselves their
existence is not absurd.
So something is different when you think about Enron and you are at a
point where you must either change you view of Enron or change your
view of what honesty is or reduce each a bit to fit a mutuals non-
arousing response. The cognition; Enron as a representative of
corporate america and the cognition; Enron the book cooker - conflict
so accourding to social psychology one of these cognitions has to be
changed or there might be more "arousal" in the future when these two
cognitions enter you mind simualtainiously.
Post by TheInquirerPost by ImmortalistJust answer the damn question, not the questioner! Don't
presume. My personal matters/beliefs are none of your
business. I ask, you answer. If you think my questions
are stupid, you have already proven that you are stupid,
not me. If you don't know the answer, can you please
"pass" to more capable person(s) to answer?
Offensive
so?
If it takes away from your argument what use is it?
Post by TheInquirer and detracts from the little persuasiveness
what position am i peddling?
> You cannot win.
win what?
An adaptation of the borg saying resistence is futile as a challenge
Post by TheInquirer--
I ask, becos I'm curious.
[ since you have been providing useful leads for my questions,
i take it off, just for you. OK?]